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Forum Brief

A Revolution in School District Governance:
The Chicago Experience

A Forum — December 11, 1998

The Chicago Public School system has undergone major, and somewhat radical, reform in the past ten years.  To research the effects of these reforms, the University of Chicago established the Consortium on Chicago School Reform in 1990, explained Dorothy Shipps, recently a Consortium director, now a professor at Teachers College, Columbia University, in New York City.  Shipps provided an overview of the two major reform efforts affecting the Chicago Public Schools and their impact on students and educators.

Chicago Public Schools is the third largest school system in the country and the largest employer in the city.  Complaints that the system was failing the children of Chicago had been heard for many years.  In 1987, U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett called the Chicago Public School system the “worst in America.”  In a series of articles published in May 1988, the Chicago Tribune portrayed Chicago public school students and parents as victims of a highly centralized system, populated by bureaucrats more concerned about protecting their jobs than improving learning.  Until 1988, Chicago Public Schools had never elected its school board. The board was appointed by the mayor and was deeply entrenched in city politics.

In 1988, the Illinois legislature revamped the school governance system by stripping the school board of its traditional authority and giving the decision-making authority to Local School Councils (LSCs), which were elected.  This legislation, (referred to as the first wave of reform) was supported by a broad coalition of business leaders and parents. The legislation focused on community empowerment and accountability, and provided the LSCs with authority to: (1) hire and fire principals; (2) control academic programs through approval of mandated annual School Improvement Plans (SIPs); (3) oversee their schools’ share of state Chapter 1 funds, which averaged approximately $500,000 in elementary schools and $800,000 in high schools; and (4) contract for support services. The Councils were composed of 11 members elected every two years.  Eight of these members had to be parents and community representatives.  The reform also created Professional Personnel Advisory Committees (PPACs), composed of teachers, to advise principals and LSCs on instructional and professional issues.  In addition, the legislation curtailed the size and power of the central office and gave overall control over school finances to the School Finance Administration, which was run by business leaders with no educational experience.

In 1995 another layer of reform was imposed over the 1988 legislation.  The 1995 reforms established a corporate-style management system directly under the mayor’s authority.  The goals of the reform were:   (1) to relegitimize the public schools by creating a system of accountability in which the mayor became ultimately responsible for the schools; (2) to attract middle class families back into the city to expand the city’s economic base by improving the schools; and (3) to improve outcomes through a standardized student accountability process.  The 1995 reform eliminated the central school board and the superintendent positions, and placed the school management under the authority of the Reform Board of Trustees appointed by the mayor.  In addition, about 25 categorical programs were consolidated into two block grants managed by the Board of Trustees, under the leadership of a CEO also appointed by the mayor. The CEO was given the power to lay off and reassign principals in schools deemed in need of intervention, thus eroding the LSCs’ autonomy.  The legislation also recommended that most of the schools’ support services be privatized, and it reduced the teacher union’s bargaining power.  Finally, the 1995 reforms established minimum scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) as a requirement for grade promotion.  (Children who did not meet the minimum passing score were allowed to attend summer programs and re-take the test.)  Schools with 15 percent or more of the children unable to pass the test were placed on probation.

Both waves of reform had a significant impact on educators.  School administrators in the central office, who had experienced severe cuts during the 1988 reform, were further downsized in 1995 through privatization of many functions.  In addition, the top jobs were given to business and financial managers who did not have any experience in education or school management. The 1988 legislation also stripped principals of their tenure and placed them under the LSCs’ scrutiny. Under the 1995 reforms, the CEO could fire principals of low-performing schools and the school would be placed under a probation team.  Between 1988 and 1995, 80 percent of Chicago schools changed principals, and 40 percent of them changed principals at least three times.

The 1988 reform did not affect teachers dramatically.  Two of the 11 seats on the LSCs were reserved for teachers, and their bargaining power was maintained.  However, the 1995 reforms imposed both a moratorium on the teachers’ right to strike and a reduction in educational issues eligible for bargaining.  Teachers lost control over academic-related decisions, including student retention and promotion decisions.  In addition, both reforms made little effort to promote professional development opportunities through training and in-service.  In 1997, at least 10,000 Chicago students had been retained at their grade level and 116 schools were placed on probation.  According to the legislation, if passing rates do not improve in these schools, the CEO has the authority to disband the LSC and hire new principals and teachers.

Among the benefits brought about by the 1988 and 1995 reforms, Shipps cites the increased access to resources from outside the school system, in particular corporate support.  Among the problems, Shipps said, is the increased dropout rate, now at 46 percent, without significant improvement in test scores.  Moreover, partisan fights mark the whole process, and information is politically filtered, so that the public has little knowledge of what is happening within Chicago schools.  Without information, Shipps indicated, it is difficult to assess the impact of the reforms on those who are the most affected by the process, the students.

This information is from an American Youth Policy Forum held on December 11, 1998 on Capitol Hill.  Reported by Sonia Jurich.

The events of the Forum are made possible by the support of a consortium of philanthropic foundations: Pew Charitable Trusts, Charles S. Mott Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Ford Foundation, General Electric Fund and others.